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Executive summary 
This brief review of research was carried out to inform whether the Personal Accounts 
Delivery Authority (PADA) should be making decisions for its members with regard 
to pension fund choices. The findings are based on a review of around 80 items, 
mostly involving research carried out in the US and UK. The body of evidence mainly 
comes from the discipline of economics and the field of behavioural economics in 
particular. Survey data was the most common type of evidence, but the review 
included qualitative research as well. 
 
Key messages 
 
The key messages for the Personal Accounts Delivery Authority are outlined below, 
with reference to the specific questions set out in the research specification.  
 
Do people make investment decisions that are too conservative to meet their 
intended objectives? 
The research evidence indicates a widespread lack of knowledge and understanding 
about pensions and investment choice. In addition, UK consumers (and women in 
particular) are generally found to be risk averse (section 2). In keeping with this, 
consumers have been found to focus more on minimising financial losses than 
maximising financial gains, even when making decisions about long-term investments 
such as a pension (section 4.2). 
 
Faced with complex investment choices, there is evidence that people use what are 
called ‘naïve diversification strategies’ (e.g. they may divide their pension 
contribution equally among the number of funds offered by a plan), which may result 
in sub-optimal decisions (i.e. less favourable or desirable decisions) with regard to 
their potential income in retirement. Individuals’ investment decisions are also 
strongly influenced by the number and mix of investment choices that are offered 
(known as framing effects), highlighting the importance of pension plan design in 
achieving desired outcomes (section 4.2). 
 
Giving people pension fund choice appears to encourage investment in equity funds 
and international evidence from mandatory individual account pension schemes 
reveals a general preference among participants for equity funds. This may result 
from factors such as framing effects, the use of ‘rules of thumb’ by consumers to 
make investment decisions or the professional advice that consumers receive (section 
4.3).  
 
Other research indicates that the picture regarding participants’ apparent preference 
for equities is not clear cut. There is evidence from the US that allocation to equities 
is polarised between those participants who have no allocation to equities and those 
who have invested entirely in equities. Moreover, allocation to equities has been 
shown to decrease with the number of investment options offered (section 4.3).  
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In recent qualitative research conducted with people in the target group for automatic 
enrolment under the UK Government’s workplace pension reforms, participants 
mainly expressed interest in investing in lower-risk pension funds (section 4.3). 
 
While there is evidence of a positive link between income and equity asset allocation 
in pension plans (with higher equity allocations among higher earners), studies in the 
US and Sweden indicate that the differences are not great. This suggests that some 
participants on lower incomes may have poorly diversified portfolios and be over-
exposed to risk. One explanation might be that these participants expect to have other 
resources in retirement, such as a state guaranteed minimum income, and so have 
little to lose by taking risks. Similar behaviour has been seen among people who have 
a defined benefit pension plan as well as a defined contribution plan (section 4.3.1). 
 
What is the likelihood of pension scheme members switching investment funds 
over time?  Is there any evidence that people switching between pension funds do 
not make sensible investment choices, given their personal and household 
circumstances? 
The evidence shows a general trend of low levels of investment fund switching by 
pension plan participants. Evidence from the US and Sweden indicates that fewer than 
two in ten pension plan members switched funds on at least one occasion in 2007. 
There is some evidence to suggest that providing information does little to encourage 
fund switching or rebalancing (section 4.4).  
 
There seems to be very little data about whether or not people make sensible choices 
when switching funds. One study in Australia highlighted problems with the advice 
provided to superannuation scheme members around fund switching, which involved 
advice to switch to higher fee funds with no countervailing benefits or the loss of 
important insurance cover (section 4.2.1). 
 
In the context of the personal accounts scheme, what is the evidence around 
individuals’ likelihood of making an active investment choice rather than staying 
in the default fund? 
There is considerable variation in levels of active decision making between countries 
that operate mandatory individual account pension schemes. On the whole, 
international evidence seems to support the notion that a large number of investment 
options can cause information overload, resulting in confusion among scheme 
participants and greater use of default funds. As a result countries (such as Central 
and East European countries and Hong Kong) that offer limited investment choice 
seem to have much higher levels of people making an active choice (over 80 per cent 
in some countries). In contrast, countries offering a wide choice of pension investment 
funds (US, Sweden, Australia) tend to have lower levels of people making active 
choices and correspondingly higher proportions of people enrolled in the default 
options (section 4.5).  
 
One study in the US found that between 65 and 87 per cent of new participants saved 
at least temporarily in the default fund and at the default contribution rate, and a 
significant proportion (45 per cent) continued to do so three years later. The generally 
conservative nature of default investment funds combined with low default 
contribution rates has raised concerns about the possible sub-optimal outcome for 
these plan members (section 4.5).  
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In Sweden, overall figures show that 58 per cent of pension savers have made an 
active choice, but this masks a rapid decline in the proportion doing so over time, 
from 67 per cent when the scheme was introduced in 2000, to 1.6 per cent in 2007. It 
is notable that during the period 2001-2005, the Swedish default fund performed 
better than an average of all funds that could be actively chosen, and was considerably 
cheaper. The continued decline in active decision making between 2006 and 2007 is 
partly attributed to a change in the communications strategy, whereby scheme 
members no longer automatically receive information about their investment fund 
options (section 4.5).  
 
Evidence (for example from Peru) also suggests that default funds that have low 
charges and perform well can result in low levels of active investment choice (section 
4.5). 
 
In qualitative research in the UK around proposed pension reforms, most participants 
said they would personally want to make an active investment choice if they were 
automatically enrolled into a workplace pension scheme.
1 This was largely driven by 
a desire to have personal control over the level of investment risk. Adequate 
information was considered crucial if individuals were to make an investment choice, 
including clear explanations of the different levels of risk associated with investment 
funds (section 4.5). 
 
Other key findings 
 
Understanding of and attitudes to investment risk (section 2) 
•  Attitudes to risk depend on a wide variety of factors including age, income and 
wealth, gender, marital status, personality, educational attainment, and level of 
financial knowledge and experience. 
•  There is fairly consistent evidence that women are more risk-averse than men in 
their attitudes and behaviours towards investment decisions. Some studies argue 
that factors such as marital status, wealth and income, play a bigger role than 
gender in explaining these different attitudes to risk 
•  Attitudes to risk change over time. Willingness to take financial risk tends to 
decrease significantly among people at or near retirement. Research on measuring 
investors’ appetite for risk suggests that it falls sharply during economic crises. 
 
Number of investment fund options (section 4.1) 
•  The extent of investment fund choice varies widely across the mandatory 
individual account pension schemes that operate worldwide. The greatest choice is 
seen in the US, Sweden and Australia. 
•  US evidence indicates that increased investment fund choice reduces rather than 
increases the likelihood of participation in retirement savings plans, which 
supports the notion of choice and information overload. 
•  In qualitative research in the UK with the target group for automatic enrolment, 
participants considered that between three and five investment funds was a 
manageable number to choose from. 
 
Information and education 
                                                 
1 Though previous research indicates that people tend to be overly optimistic about taking action  
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•  Evidence from the US suggests that information provision and financial education 
has a limited impact on individual behaviour in relation to making investment 
fund choices (section 4.2) and fund switching (section 4.4). 
•  In Sweden, however, the communications strategy adopted by the mandatory 
pension scheme seems to have had a considerable impact on levels of active 
decision making (section 4.5).  
•  While many people may rely on professional financial advice to make pension 
purchase and investment decisions, research from the UK and Australia has 
highlighted concerns about the quality of advice provided to individuals (section 
4.2.1). 
 
Pension savings adequacy (section 5) 
•  Many adults in the US and UK are not confident that they are saving enough for 
their retirement and these concerns are borne out by analysis of actual pension 
savings adequacy. 
•  On the whole, individuals with a private pension are likely to have greater levels 
of pension wealth or other financial resources to fund their retirement than those 
who do not.  
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1 Introduction 
The main research objective of this research review was to examine whether there is 
any evidence to inform whether the Personal Accounts Delivery Authority (PADA) 
should be making decisions for its members with regard to pension fund choices.  
 
The specific research questions for the review were as follows: 
 
1.  What literature has been written about individuals’ behaviour when making 
investment choices? 
2.  What are the key findings from this literature (in summary)? 
3.  What does the literature tell us about people making investment decisions that 
are too conservative to meet their intended objectives?  For example is there 
evidence that: 
a.  People do not take enough risk to achieve their desired outcome; or 
b.  People do not take into account other assets they may hold when 
making investment decisions? 
4.  Is there any evidence that people switching between pension funds do not 
make sensible investment choices given their personal and household 
circumstances? 
5.  In the context of the personal accounts scheme, what is the evidence around 
individuals’ likelihood of actually making an active investment choice versus 
staying in the default fund, and whether they will switch funds during their 
time as a member of the scheme? 
 
The main focus of the review was investment behaviour in relation to pensions, and 
this is reflected in the research that was identified. 
 
As the timetable for the review was short, a systematic literature review was not 
feasible. Instead a brief research review was conducted to identify key research 
findings relevant to the specific research questions. This comprised two elements: 
first, a review of bibliographic databases including the International Bibliography of 
the Social Sciences and Google Scholar; and secondly, a review of research carried 
out by government departments, regulators and trade bodies including organisations 
such as the Department for Work and Pensions, the Financial Services Authority and 
the Association of British Insurers.  
1.1  Summary of research that has been reviewed 
In total, around 80 items were identified as being relevant to the aims and objectives 
of this review. Most of these items were pension-specific, while the rest relate to 
financial risk or investments more generally. Most of the research evidence comes 
from the US or the UK, with some additional material from Australia, Sweden and the 
Netherlands.  
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As we might expect, most of the research literature comes from the discipline of 
economics. In particular, there is a considerable body of work on individual 
investment behaviour from the field of behavioural economics. Survey data was by 
far the most common type of research evidence, and included both continuous surveys 
such as the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing and the Survey of Consumer 
Finances (US), and bespoke surveys commissioned for particular studies. Other 
sources of research evidence included administrative data (e.g. from employer 
pension plans), experimental studies, qualitative data and official statistics. 
 
The research we have identified falls in the following categories: 
 
•  Understanding of and attitudes to investment risk 
•  Behaviour in relation to investment choice 
•  Pension fund choices: 
o  How do people choose? 
o  What types of funds do they choose? 
o  Do they switch between funds? 
o  Do people make active investment choices or stay in a default fund? 
•  Pension savings adequacy. 
 
The findings from each of these categories are outlined in the following sections.  
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2 Understanding  of  and  attitudes to investment risk 
Recent qualitative research from the UK found that most consumers had a basic 
understanding of the risk-reward relationship (i.e. higher risk meant potentially 
greater rewards; lower risk meant they stood to lose less but in turn the rewards would 
be less). Beyond this, however, understanding was limited. Most did not have a clear 
idea of what these risks actually were and many felt that long-term investments were 
riskier, mainly because they would not be able to access their money in the case of 
unexpected events (IFF Research, 2007). 
 
There seems to be considerable confusion among UK consumers about the levels of 
risk associated with different investment products and fund types. Most consumers in 
a recent qualitative study believed (wrongly) that there was no capital at stake in low-
risk investments (IFF Research, 2007). The Baseline Survey of Financial Capability 
indicates that some risk-averse consumers may take out investment products unaware 
that there is any financial risk involved (Atkinson et al., 2006). 
 
Qualitative and quantitative research in the UK consistently shows that people’s 
knowledge and understanding of pensions is generally poor (Clery et al., 2007; 
Summers et al., 2005; Loretto et al., 2001). Many participants in a recent qualitative 
study were unaware that pension funds were invested on the stock market, and instead 
tended to view them as long-term savings accounts (Bunt et al., 2006). A random 
survey of the British population found that pension plan participants were often 
ignorant of the basic structure of different types of retirement savings options and the 
risks associated with them. The survey found that almost half (43%) of respondents 
with an occupational pension scheme were not sure if they had a defined benefit (DB) 
or a defined contribution (DC) pension plan (Clark and Strauss, 2008). 
2.1  Attitudes to risk 
Quantitative and qualitative research carried out in the UK indicates that attitudes to 
investment risk depend on factors such as personality, circumstances, educational 
attainment, level of financial knowledge and experience, and extent of financial 
product portfolio (Conquest Research Limited, 2004; Distribution Technology, 2005). 
Quantitative research carried out in the US identifies a similar range of factors, 
including income, wealth, age, marital status, gender and level of education (Finke 
and Huston, 2003).  
 
In general, it has been observed that women are more risk averse than men, the young 
are more risk seeking than the old, wealthier individuals manifest a greater 
willingness to invest in equities and the poor are risk averse (Clark and Strauss, 2008). 
One US survey (of faculty and staff working at a large university) found that a 
combination of education, financial knowledge, income and occupation explained the 
most between-group variability in risk tolerance. Even so, this model only explained 
about 22% of an individual’s financial risk tolerance, suggesting that other factors  
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might differentiate levels of risk tolerance more effectively, such as attitudinal or 
psychological factors (Grable, 2000). 
 
Attitudes to risk change over time as needs alter and people’s capacity to afford to 
lose varies (Conquest Research Limited, 2004). The evidence indicates fairly clearly 
that willingness to take financial risk decreases significantly among people who are 
retired or nearing retirement (Distribution Technology, 2005; Finke and Huston, 
2003). In addition, work carried out in the UK on the measurement of investors’ risk 
appetite (which depends on their attitude to risk) suggests that it fluctuates within a 
relatively narrow gauge during ‘normal’ times, but falls sharply during crises (Gai and 
Vause, 2005). 
 
On the whole, UK consumers have been found to be risk averse - particularly non-
savers and those on low incomes (Atkinson et al., 2006; Hall et al., 2006; Distribution 
Technology, 2005; Conquest Research Limited, 2004). In relation to pensions, the 
majority of people in a recent UK national survey believed that a private pension 
scheme linked to the stock market was too much of a risk (Clery et al., 2007). Similar 
views were expressed by consumers in qualitative research; given the choice, many 
people would opt for a low-risk pension fund, despite the likely lower rate of return 
(Bunt et al., 2006). In another survey, respondents were asked to rate, on scale of 1 to 
5, a range of potential features of a pension scheme that they would value. Four in ten 
(37 per cent) gave a high rating (4 or 5) to the concept of a guaranteed minimum level 
of pension (Summers et al., 2005). 
 
In a recent nationally representative survey of the attitudes and likely behaviour in 
response to workplace pension schemes of individuals who would be eligible for the 
reforms, 44 per cent of respondents were classified as risk averse based on a standard 
measure of risk preference. About two in ten (17 per cent) were classified as being 
very mildly risk averse and 29 per cent were classified as risk loving (Webb et al, 
2008). 
 
Qualitative research conducted with people in the target group for automatic 
enrolment under the Government’s workplace pension reforms found that most 
participants were unwilling to take risks with their money, even over the long-term 
(five years or more). The most common reasons cited for being averse to taking risk 
included the responsibility of raising a family and taking on large financial 
commitments such as a mortgage. Consequently, they were mainly interested in being 
able to choose lower-risk pension investment funds (Collard and Breuer, 2009). 
2.1.1  Gender differences in attitudes to risk 
Empirical research (most of it from the US in the form of large-scale surveys) 
demonstrates fairly consistently that women are more risk averse than men in their 
attitudes and behaviours towards investment decisions, including those that relate to 
pensions. A review of psychological studies suggests that this reflects a lower 
tolerance to risk among women generally, financial or otherwise (Byrnes, Miller and 
Schafer, 1999, cited in Watson and McNaughton, 2007). 
 
A number of studies have variously controlled for age, education, income, wealth and 
marital status, and found a gender difference exists independently of the influence of 
these characteristics. For example, analysis of the US Survey of Consumer Finances  
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found that the proportions of wealth held in risky asset classes grew more steeply for 
men with increasing wealth  (Jianakopolos and Bernasek, 1998). A small-scale survey 
of university academics in the US (Bernasek and Shwiff, 2001) also found that the 
lower levels of stocks in women’s pension plans held true regardless of marital status 
(as well as financial decision-making responsibilities within couples).  
 
Women have been found to be less likely than men to have a defined contribution 
(DC) pension plan (Sunden and Surette, 1998). Consistent with the finding that they 
tended to hold more conservative asset classes in their overall investment portfolios 
(Jianakopolos and Bernasek, 1998), women with DC pension plans in the US 
allocated a smaller proportion of their plan to stocks (Bernasek and Shwiff, 2001). In 
a study carried out in Australia, women chose more conservative investment plans for 
their superannuation schemes than men (Watson and McNaughton, 2007).  
 
Some studies indicate that marital status and wealth play bigger roles than gender, in 
some cases supplanting the effects of gender. Analysis of the US Survey of Consumer 
Finances (Sunden and Surette, 1998) found that gender differences in DC pension 
fund allocations could only be understood in combination with marital status: other 
things being equal, single women and married men were less likely than single men to 
choose "mostly stocks" (a riskier portfolio) and married women were more likely than 
single women to choose this. The tendency for women to invest in less risky asset 
classes than men appeared to be attributable to differences in wealth, as measured by 
net worth and expectation of an inheritance (Embry and Fox, 1997). An Australian 
study concluded that, despite evidence of gender differences in risk preferences, lower 
income was the main contributor to lower projected retirement benefits among 
women (Watson and McNaughton, 2007). 
 
Finally, the explanations for gender differences observed in research have been 
summarised with reference to gender inequalities in wealth and the different gender 
roles that impact on these inequalities (Bajtelsmit and Bernasek, 1996). The authors 
suggest that the explanations can be categorised in terms of outcomes (wealth, income 
and employment) and that these outcomes are caused by gender discrimination in 
labour and credit markets, investment advice and information on investment decision 
making, education, skills and training and responsibility for the care of dependents. 
2.2  Summary of key points 
•  UK consumers have low levels of knowledge and understanding about pensions 
and investments. They also tend to be risk averse. 
•  Attitudes to risk depend on a wide variety of factors including age, income and 
wealth, gender, marital status, personality, educational attainment, and level of 
financial knowledge and experience. 
•  On the whole, women tend to be more risk averse than men. Some studies argue 
that factors such as marital status, wealth and income play a bigger role than 
gender in explaining differences in attitudes to risk 
•  Attitudes to risk change over time. In particular, willingness to take financial risk 
tends to decrease significantly among people at or near retirement. Research on 
measuring investors’ appetite for risk suggests that it falls sharply during 
economic crises.  
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3  Behaviour in relation to investment choice 
Much of the literature on investment choice behaviour comes from the field of 
behavioural economics. The evidence base for this literature comes largely from the 
US, much of it in relation to the behaviour of participants in 401(k) retirement savings 
plans.
2  Most of the evidence is drawn from survey data, and includes observations of 
actual behaviour as well as some observations from experimental studies. 
 
Various authors have reviewed the behavioural economics literature relating to 
pension investment choice, including Gallery and Gallery (2005) and Clark and 
Strauss (2008). In addition, Tapia and Yermo (2007) carried out a review for the 
OECD of mandatory individual account pension systems, which share some of the 
characteristics of the proposed personal accounts scheme in the UK. We draw heavily 
on these earlier reviews in this section. 
 
According to modern portfolio theory, rational investors should hold diversified 
portfolios that include the most efficient combinations of assets to optimise risk and 
return, and which reflect investor utility preferences and time horizons (Gallery and 
Gallery, 2005).
3  Individuals do not always act according to economic theory, 
however, particularly under conditions of risk and uncertainty (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979, cited in Clark and Strauss 2008), a position supported by more recent 
empirical research.  
 
The review carried out for the OECD summarises the range of obstacles and 
challenges identified by behavioural economists that compromise good investment 
decision making (Tapia and Yermo, 2007). It identifies six main factors that are 
widely accepted and frequently cited in the literature on investment choice: choice 
and information overload, unstable or undefined preferences, heuristic decision 
making (use of short-cuts and rules of thumb), framing effects and investment menu 
design, procrastination and inertia, and overconfidence. These factors are outlined 
below. We also consider a seventh factor that is implicit in some of the work cited by 
Tapia and Yermo (2007) – the apparent lack of consumer understanding and 
knowledge about pensions and investment choice. 
3.1  Choice and information overload 
As Tapia and Yermo (2007) note, there is considerable evidence (mainly from the US 
in relation to 401(k) retirement savings plans) that too many investment choices can 
cause information overload. This, in turn, may lead to declining rates of pension 
                                                 
2 A 401(k) retirement savings plan is a type of defined contribution plan sponsored by employers. 
Employees choose a percentage of their salary to contribute to the plan, and employers may also make 
a contribution. . The employee’s contributions are invested, and any earnings are tax-deferred until the 
employee draws the money out at retirement. . In participant-directed plans (the most common type of 
plan), the employee can select from a number of investment options. 
3 In economics, utility is a measure of the relative satisfaction from consuming a good or service, in 
this case a pension or investment. 
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participation and a greater use of the default fund option. As we go on to discuss in 
section 4.1, pension plan participants in some countries have a vast range of 
investment fund choices. Use of the default fund option in pension schemes is 
discussed in detail in section 4.5. 
3.2  Unstable or undefined preferences 
The behavioural economics literature indicates that individuals often do not arrive at 
an investment decision with firm preferences. The most frequently cited work, carried 
out in the US, found that pension plan participants appeared to have relatively weak 
preferences for the portfolio they had selected themselves (Benartzi and Thaler, 
2001). In this experimental study, participants were given the choice between the 
distribution of retirement outcomes implied by the actual asset allocation in their 
401(k) plan and the distribution implied by the average allocation among all 
participants in the same plan. Most participants preferred the average distribution to 
that based on their own allocation. The authors characterised this as an example of an 
aversion to ‘extremeness’ because most participants had portfolios that were, almost 
by definition, more extreme than the average. Such results seem to call into question 
individuals’ ability to choose an optimal asset allocation (i.e. the most favourable 
allocation that would best meet their financial needs). As Tapia and Yermo (2007) 
note, this may be symptomatic of a deeper lack of knowledge and understanding of 
the choices offered. 
 
A national survey carried out in the Netherlands seems to provide further evidence of 
unstable preferences in relation to asset allocation. When given the choice, the typical 
respondent opted for a conservative portfolio with stocks making up only 30 per cent 
of the average portfolio. However, there was a tendency for respondents to switch to a 
riskier portfolio when shown the distribution of long-run returns on their own 
portfolio and the mean risk portfolio, e.g. containing more stocks (Van Rooij et al., 
2007a). The authors suggest that these findings indicate that many Dutch pension plan 
participants lack the necessary skills to be in charge of their own pension investment 
portfolio.  
3.3 Heuristic  decision  making (rules of thumb) 
Individuals may take mental short cuts to reach a decision, particularly when there is 
time pressure or when other factors (such as lack of understanding) make it difficult to 
asses the available choices (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, cited in Tapia and Yermo 
2007). There is a considerable body of work on the naïve diversification strategies 
that individuals use to make investment choices, again much of it emanating from 
research into 401(k) retirement savings plans in the US. These strategies are discussed 
in more detail in section 4.2. 
3.4  Framing effects and investment menu design 
Tapia and Yermo (2007) cite evidence from the US that the investment choices made 
by individuals in relation to 401(k) retirement savings plans are affected by the 
numbering and order of the investment options that are presented to them (see section 
4.2 below). This is supported by experimental research carried out in the UK 
(Goodman, Undated), although this focused on investment decisions generally, rather 
than pensions. Tapia and Yermo (2007) also cite US research evidence that investors  
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may react differently depending on whether the long-term or short-term results are 
presented to them. Again, they suggest that this might be evidence of lack of 
consumer knowledge or ability to make such complex decisions. 
3.5  Procrastination and inertia 
Tapia and Yermo (2007) cite evidence (again mostly from the US in relation to 401(k) 
retirement savings plans) that individuals are affected by inertia or procrastination 
(i.e. they put off a decision until tomorrow) when faced with decisions about 
investment choice. This has been shown to result in sub-optimal choices (i.e. less 
favourable or desirable choices) that may not meet the individual’s financial needs 
and a failure by pension plan participants to rebalance their portfolios. We discuss the 
strategies that people use to make investment choices in detail in section 4.2. 
Evidence about the types of funds that people chose is presented in section 4.3, and 
research findings about the frequency of switching between funds is discussed in 
section 4.4.  
3.6 Overconfidence 
A final factor reported by Tapia and Yermo (2007) is that individuals may be 
overconfident and overestimate their knowledge and abilities when making 
investment choices. The research they cite, however, seems mostly to relate to 
individual investors who make a proactive choice to trade. Its relevance to private 
pension schemes may therefore be limited, particularly as some of the other obstacles 
and challenges reported above are judged to be rooted in a lack of knowledge and 
understanding among individuals.  
3.7  Consumer lack of understanding and knowledge  
Additional evidence from the US and the UK supports the notion that individuals lack 
the knowledge and understanding to make pension investment choices. 
 
Clark and Strauss (2008) cite evidence from the US that calls into question the ability 
of pension plan participants to make decisions that are consistent with their long-term 
financial needs, because of lack of financial knowledge and understanding. In a 
survey of US employers offering 401(k) plans, 80 per cent of employers reported that 
their employees were confused about ‘where to invest/what funds to use’ and 55 per 
cent reported that employees were confused about how much to save for retirement 
(Deloitte, 2008). 
 
Qualitative research carried out in the UK indicates that (with some exceptions) 
consumers generally find choice in pension schemes confusing (Hall et al., 2006) and 
feel ill-equipped to make decisions about the sorts of funds they should invest in, 
without first seeking professional advice (Bunt et al., 2006). For some groups (low 
income and those without pension provision), even in the case of making a choice 
from a shortlist, reservations about making a provider choice persisted (Hall et al, 
2006). A survey carried out in one UK company found that knowledge and interest in 
pensions and investment choice was low among members of its occupational pension 
scheme; scheme members who had received financial advice exhibited more interest 
and knowledge, however (Byrne, 2007). 
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Other qualitative research with UK workers eligible to join an employer pension 
scheme found that pension purchasing decisions were generally characterised by 
confusion and apathy, with decisions taken in a way that was neither completely 
rational or completely informed (Harrison et al., 2006). 
 
3.8  Summary of key points 
•  The field of behavioural economics provides much of the literature on 
investment choice behaviour. The main body of evidence relates to the 
behaviour of participants in 401(k) retirement savings plans in the US. 
•  Six key factors have been identified that may hinder good investment 
decision making among individuals: 
o  Choice and information overload 
o  Unstable or poorly defined investment preferences 
o  Heuristic decision making which involves the use of mental shortcuts 
or rules of thumb 
o  The framing and presentation of investment choices to consumers 
o  Procrastination and inertia 
o  Overconfidence, although this seems to apply mainly to individual 
investors who make a proactive choice to trade. 
•  There is also evidence that consumers lack the understanding and 
knowledge to make pension investment choices themselves.  
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4  Pension fund choices 
This section looks in detail at the evidence on pension fund choice: the number of 
investment fund options open to people, what strategies people use to make pension 
investment choices and the types of investment funds they choose. It also looks at the 
extent to which people switch investment funds within their pension scheme. The 
final section explores the evidence relating to whether people make an active 
investment choice or stay in a default scheme.  
 
The majority of evidence comes from studies carried out in the US, usually involving 
analysis of survey data and administrative data. There is some additional material 
from the UK, Sweden, Australia and the Netherlands, again mainly comprising 
analysis of survey and administrative data, as well as official statistics and some 
qualitative data. 
4.1  Number of investment fund options 
In their review of mandatory individual account pension systems, Tapia and Yermo 
(2007) identify some countries (e.g. Chile, Hungary, Hong Kong) that offer pension 
plan participants a limited range of fund choices, typically no more than five, where 
the funds are differentiated mainly by the proportion invested in equities. In contrast, 
other countries (US, Sweden, Australia) offer relatively unlimited investment choices 
to plan participants. The most recent statistics for Sweden, for example, show that in 
2007 there were 86 fund management companies with a total of 785 funds registered 
with the premium pension system (Premium Pension Authority, 2007). 
 
A survey of US employers indicates that the average number of investment options 
offered by employers in their pension schemes increased from 14 to 17 in 2007 
(including ‘premixed’ portfolios) (Hewitt Associates LLC, 2007). Administrative data 
from one large pension plan provider indicate that the average plan offered 23 
investment options in 2007, up from 13 in 2000. They note that plan sponsors (i.e. 
employers) add fund options at a faster rate than participants use them. Nearly half of 
plans (47 per cent) offered between 11 and 20 options, but 56 per cent of participants 
used only one, two or three options (Vanguard, 2008). 
 
Iyengar and Lepper (2000) found that, while people generally value choice, they can 
easily be overwhelmed by it. They suggest that choice overload may be exacerbated 
in contexts (such as decisions about major stock purchases) where the costs associated 
with making the ‘wrong choice’ or even the belief that there are truly ‘wrong’ choices 
are much more worrying to an individual (cited in Singh et al., 2005).  
 
Rather than promote consumer choice and active decision making, increased fund 
choice has been shown to depress the probability of employee participation in 401(k) 
retirement savings plans. Analysis of administrative data from 401(k) plans indicates 
that, other things being equal, every ten funds added was associated with a 1.5 to 2 
per cent drop in participation rates (Sethi-Iyengar et al., 2004). The same analysis  
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found that the majority of 401(k) plans offered between 10 and 30 options, but that 
plans offering fewer options had significantly higher employee participation rates. 
Similarly, an experimental study undertaken in the US found that fewer investment 
choices resulted in less information overload, but only among individuals with above 
average financial knowledge, as assessed by a financial literacy test (Agnew and 
Szykman, 2004). There is also evidence that the number of investment options offered 
to pension plan participants can impact on asset allocation; this is discussed in detail 
in section 4.3. 
 
In recent qualitative research conducted with people in the target group for automatic 
enrolment under the UK Government’s workplace pension reforms, most participants 
suggested that between three and five investment funds would be a manageable 
number to choose from. They also felt strongly that funds should be clearly 
differentiated in terms of risk, in order to help people choose between them (Collard 
and Breuer, 2009). 
4.2  How do people make investment choices? 
As outlined in section 3.3, evidence from the field of behavioural economics (largely 
based on research carried out in the US) indicates that individuals use what are called 
naïve diversification strategies in order to make complex decisions like investment 
fund choice. Examples of these strategies include individuals dividing their pension 
contribution equally among the number of funds offered by a plan (known as 1/n); 
relying on recent past performance when choosing funds, or favouring company stock 
(Benartzi and Thaler 2001; Huberman and Jiang 2006, cited in Tapia and Yermo 
2007).  
 
In keeping with this, qualitative research in the UK that explored investment decisions 
generally (not specifically pensions) found that level of risk, charges and fund size 
were mainly only considered by respondents who were more financially sophisticated. 
Among those with lower financial sophistication, investment performance was 
generally only considered in consultation with an adviser, and even then 
comprehension remained poor (Conquest Research Limited, 2004). UK survey 
evidence (which used gambling scenarios to assess people’s attitude to risk) suggests 
that consumers more often focus on avoiding losses than on maximising possible 
gains (Distribution Technology, 2005). US research cited by Byrne (2007) found that 
investors with DC pension plans tended to seek to avoid short-term losses, despite the 
long time horizon usually involved in planning for retirement, a phenomena known as 
myopic loss aversion. 
 
Several studies have shown that framing effects and investment menu design have a 
significant effect on individuals’ investment decisions, which may result in sub-
optimal investment choices that are unlikely to meet the individual’s financial needs 
in retirement.
4  Notably, there is a positive relationship between the proportion of 
equity funds offered by a pension plan and the proportion of overall plan portfolios 
invested in equities (Choi et al., 2004). Analysis of US 401(k) administrative data 
shows that this holds true for other asset classes as well (Brown et al., 2007). 
Consequently, it appears to be possible to influence the portfolio allocation of 
                                                 
4 This is referred to by some authors as prospect relativity: the dependence of human preferences on the 
set of options they are presented with (Vlaev et al, 2007).   
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participants by altering the mix of equity and bond funds that are offered, even if the 
overall investment fund offering remains the same (ibid). 
 
The same conclusion has been reached in the UK, based on evidence from 
experimental studies. One study concluded that people choosing from a range of 
investment options tended to select the middle option whether the overall range is low 
or high in value (Goodman, undated). Another study found that various measures of 
risk aversion (in the form of questions about the amount of risk that respondents were 
prepared to take, how concerned they were about their financial future and whether or 
not they would take a gamble to increase their earned income) did not account for the 
amount of risk taken by respondents in each experimental condition (Vlaev et al., 
2007).
5  According to the authors, these findings support the notion that individuals’ 
decisions can be influenced by manipulating the range of choice options. 
 
Evidence from the US has found that workplace-based financial education for 401(k) 
plan participants resulted in increased participation and greater portfolio 
diversification, particularly for employees hired under automatic enrolment, but the 
magnitude of change was not great (Madrian and Shea, 2001). Another US study 
which examined data for employees at a large university found that peer effects 
among employees may be an important determinant of savings decisions in 401(k) 
pension plans (Duflo and Saez, 2002). 
 
4.2.1  Use of advice in pension purchase 
Recent UK survey data indicates that around 50 per cent of private pension purchasers 
received advice pre-purchase, where an adviser either recommended a product or 
recommended a product and went on to arrange a sale (Finney and Kempson, 2008 
forthcoming).
 6 The quality of financial advice that consumers receive has, however, 
been called into question by a number of research studies. 
 
UK consumer research (both qualitative and quantitative) has highlighted disparities 
between consumer and adviser definitions of ‘low risk’ (Conquest Research Limited, 
2004) and the risk involved in different investment products (Diacon, 2002). Mystery 
shopping among 50 firms offering financial advice found that just over a quarter of 
firms established customers’ attitudes to risk ambiguously, and a few did not establish 
it at all (Financial Services Authority, 2006). 
 
In Australia, shadow shopping in relation to superannuation schemes highlighted that 
in some cases advice was not appropriate for the customers’ needs in some way, or 
the adviser had not made sufficient enquiries to assess appropriateness. Where advice 
was provided on switching investment funds, in about a third of cases it was assessed 
that there was clearly or probably not a reasonable basis for the advice. The main 
problems involved advice to switch to higher-fee funds with no countervailing 
benefits or the loss of important insurance cover through fund switching (Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission, 2006).  
                                                 
5 The base for this study was low, comprising 64 respondents (representing a response rate of 10%). 
6 The base for pension purchasers was small, however (n 57).  
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4.3  What types of pension funds do people choose? 
Based on analysis of US pension plan participants in their 50s and 60s, it has been 
estimated that participants who are given investment choice are more likely to invest 
in stocks (and also to contribute to their plan and to have larger sums of money saved 
in their plan) than comparable participants without investment choice (Papke, 2003). 
A review of research on 401(k) plan designs supports this assertion (Choi et al., 
2004). Tapia and Yermo (2007) conclude from their review of mandatory individual 
account pension schemes that, in general terms, international evidence appears to 
reveal a preference among plan members towards equity funds. They note, however, 
that this may be due to factors such as heuristic biases, framing effects and the 
professional advice that members receive.  
 
Other research (primarily from the US) suggests a rather more complex picture in 
terms of individuals’ pension fund choices. As mentioned above, there is evidence 
that choice overload can impact on asset allocation. A review of evidence found that 
an increase in the number of investment funds available to choose from was 
correlated with a shift from equities towards lower-risk asset classes (Choi et al., 
2004). Other US research cited in Tapia and Yermo (2007) supports this (Sethi-
Iyengar and Kamenica, 2006). 
 
Administrative data from a large US 401(k) plan provider shows that, while just over 
70 per cent of plan assets and participant contributions were invested in equities, the 
allocation to equities varied significantly between participants. At one extreme, 11 per 
cent of participants had no allocation to equities at year-end 2007, while 17 per cent 
had their entire plan account invested in equities. Half of participants held more than 
80 per cent of the portfolios in equities (Vanguard, 2008). The authors state that while 
some participants may be making these equity allocations on the basis of their 
objectives, time horizon, risk tolerance or other personal factors, it is possible that 
others may have taken on low- or high-risk positions naively, perhaps because of a 
lack of investment knowledge or a tendency to chase market returns (ibid). 
 
In the UK, there is evidence from consumer surveys of a strong preference for 
property as a long-term investment.
7 In one general population survey, two-thirds of 
respondents believed that property was the best long-term investment, compared to 
nine per cent who chose equities (the second most popular option). Even so, less than 
half of respondents thought they would actually use property to pay for retirement 
(Association of British Insurers, 2007). In another survey, of occupational pension 
plan members at one company, respondents were asked the extent to which they 
thought different asset classes were appropriate for saving for their retirement. 
Investment in property attracted the highest scores (83 per cent for own home, 77 per 
cent for other property investments), surpassing UK equity funds and gilts by some 
way (52 per cent for UK equity funds, 50 per cent for UK gilts) (Byrne, 2007). 
 
Recent qualitative research conducted with people in the target group for automatic 
enrolment under the UK Government’s workplace pension reforms explored 
investment fund choice preferences using a range of potential options. On the whole, 
participants mainly expressed interest in investing in lower-risk pension funds 
(Collard and Breuer, 2009).  
                                                 
7 NB these studies were conducted before the dip in the property market during 2008  
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Finally, some studies have found ‘home bias’ in asset allocation, where pension plan 
participants favour investing in the stock of the company they work for or industries 
based in their own country (see for example: Choi et al., 2004; Palme et al., 2007; 
Gerrans et al., 2006).  
4.3.1  Asset allocation and personal characteristics 
A number of studies have explored the relationship between asset allocation and 
personal characteristics. As we might expect, these findings broadly mirror the 
evidence on attitudes to risk. Analysis of 401(k) administrative data from 1994-1998 
found that equity allocations were higher among higher earners, married participants, 
and those with more job seniority (Agnew et al., 2000). Similar findings are reported 
from a large-scale survey in Sweden, with a positive relationship between income and 
level of risk and evidence that married pension participants seem to pool risk (Palme 
et al., 2007). In a UK study that applied an experimental economics methodology with 
low-to-middle income workers, risk-averse participants chose safer funds, as did 
female participants (Hey, 2008).
8  Although not specifically focused on pensions, a 
Dutch household survey found that respondents with low financial literacy were 
significantly less likely to invest in equities (Van Rooij et al., 2007b).  
 
While there is evidence of a positive link between income and asset allocation, two 
studies note that the differences are not altogether clear cut. In keeping with other 
studies, recent analysis of 401(k) administrative data found that higher-income 
participants took on rather more equity risk than those on lower incomes. The 
differences in equity exposure by income were not great, however – on average 68 per 
cent for those with household incomes of less than $30,000, compared to 76 per cent 
for participants with household incomes of more than $100,000 (Vanguard, 2008). 
 
In addition, survey evidence from Sweden shows that participants at the bottom of the 
income distribution took on as much risk as those at the top, suggesting that low-
income participants were not diversifying their overall portfolio (Palme et al., 2007). 
The same study found that variability in income and the risk of exiting the labour 
market through disability, unemployment, or sickness did not appear to affect the 
investment decision (ibid). One explanation offered by the authors is that participants 
on low incomes who expect to receive the means-tested guaranteed pension benefit 
have little to lose by taking on additional risk in their pension investments, because 
the level of guaranteed benefit provides a minimum secure income (ibid).  
 
In a similar vein, there is evidence from the US Survey of Consumer Finances that 
participants who have a defined benefit (DB) pension plan underlying their DC plan 
are more likely to invest in equities than those whose primary pension provision is a 
DC plan. In other words, it appears that employees with a guaranteed source of 
retirement income are likely to invest other retirement assets more aggressively 
(Uccello, 2000). A survey of US college and university employees also identified 
                                                 
8 Hey (2008:1) describes experimental economics as follows: ‘The methodology of experimental 
economics involves the replication, in either a laboratory situation or in the field, of a well-defined 
economics problem, with participants involved in tackling the economic problem with appropriate 
incentives. A crucial element of the methodology is control over the conditions of the experiment, so 
that particular factors of interest can be investigated without confounding effects of extraneous factors.’ 
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other retirement plan participation as one of the primary drivers of risky investment 
behaviour (Dulebohn, 2002).  
 
Finally, evidence from the US (in the form of administrative data) highlights age as 
one of the key factors in determining investment decisions. As a result, plan 
participants aged between 25 and 54 were found to have the highest equity exposure 
(approximately 80 per cent of plan assets), while equity allocations were lowest for 
participants older than 65, many of whom were retired or would soon do so 
(Vanguard, 2008). Notably, the same data indicates little difference between men and 
women in equity allocation (ibid). 
4.4  Do people switch investment funds? 
The available evidence shows a general trend of low levels of investment fund 
switching by pension plan participants. In a US study, Ameriks and Zeldes (2001) 
observed that, over a ten-year period, half  (47 per cent) of their sample of pension 
plan participants made no changes to the asset allocation of new contributions, and 73 
per cent made no changes to the existing asset allocation in their accounts (cited in 
Gallery and Gallery, 2005). 
 
The most recent data from a large 401(k) pension plan provider in the US shows that 
15 per cent of participants made one or more trade during 2007 (Vanguard, 2008). 
The authors also cite recent analysis of trading in DC plans over a two-year period, 
which indicated that 80 per cent of active participants had no trading in their DC plan 
accounts.
 9 Another 11 per cent of active participants made only one trade during the 
two-year period. Only two per cent of participants were active traders, making six or 
more trades during the two-year period. Active traders were more likely to be older, 
higher income males with longer plan tenure (ibid). A US web-based survey of 
employees further supports the notion that plan participants tend to make a decision 
and then stick with it. It found that only 17 per cent of employees made any changes 
to their 401(k) planning as a result of the online investment advice offered to them. 
Around four in ten (37 per cent) did not even log on to access the advice (Lucas, 
2002). 
 
The statistics for investment fund switching in Sweden’s mandatory individual 
account pension scheme are remarkably similar to the US, so that in 2007 14 per cent 
of plan members switched funds on at least one occasion (Premium Pension 
Authority, 2007).  
 
In a UK survey of occupational pension plan members, two-thirds of respondents said 
they reviewed the investments in their pension plan at least every three years, with 48 
per cent doing so annually. The remaining third reviewed their choices less than once 
every five years or not at all. Those who did review their choices regularly made few 
changes as a result: 36 per cent made changes less than once every five years, and a 
further 43 per cent never made any changes. Members who had had advice were 
significantly more likely to review and change their investments on a regular basis 
(Byrne, 2007).  
                                                 
9 Active participants were defined as participants continuously in their DC plan for two years with at 
least one account contribution during the two-year period.  
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4.5  Do people make active investment choices or stay in a default 
fund? 
In their review of mandatory individual account pension schemes, Tapia and Yermo 
(2007) note that there is considerable variation in levels of active decision making 
across the countries operating these schemes. They find that, on the whole, 
international evidence supports the notion that a large number of investment options 
can cause information overload, resulting in confusion among scheme participants 
and greater use of default funds.  
 
In particular, there are much higher levels of active choice among scheme members in 
Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries and Hong Kong, where fewer 
investment choices are offered. For example, at least 85 per cent of scheme members 
in CEE countries have made an active choice. There are exceptions to this, such as 
Peru, where less than one per cent of scheme participants have made an active choice 
between the three possible investment options. This is attributed to the design, low 
cost and good performance of the scheme’s default fund (ibid). 
 
In contrast, other countries that offer a wide choice of pension investment funds (the 
US, Sweden and Australia) have far lower levels of active choice, and 
correspondingly higher proportions of people enrolled in the default options. 
 
Analysis of administrative data from three large US firms that automatically enrol 
new employees into 401(k) plans indicates that the majority of new participants 
(between 65 and 87 per cent) saved at least temporarily in the default fund and at the 
default contribution rate (Choi et al., 2001a). This reduced to around half of new plan 
participants after two years of scheme tenure (between 40 per cent and 54 per cent) 
and three years of scheme tenure (45 per cent) (ibid). On the basis of these findings, 
the authors raise concerns that the low default contribution rate combined with the 
conservative default investment funds may result in sub-optimal (or less desirable) 
outcomes for plan participants. One large 401(k) plan provider reports that 
participants younger than 25 are more than twice as likely to use the default option 
compared with other participants (Vanguard, 2008). Use of the default option has also 
been linked to low financial knowledge in an experimental study carried out in the US 
(Agnew and Szykman, 2004). 
 
In terms of the trend in the percentage of active pension savers in Sweden, by the end 
of 2007 almost six in ten (58 per cent) pension savers in the Premium Pension 
Scheme overall had made an active choice and their share of total pension assets 
amounted to 72 per cent  (Premium Pension Authority, 2007). This trend masks a 
sharp decline over time in the percentage of pension savers making an active choice in 
the scheme, however. In 2000, when the scheme was first launched, 67 per cent of 
savers made an active choice. In 2007, this was 1.6 per cent, down from 7.4 per cent 
in 2006, largely attributed to a change in the scheme’s communication strategy. 
Consequently, new savers were no longer automatically sent a ‘selection package’ 
with detailed information about the scheme (including a fund selection form, a guide 
to fund selection and a fund directory) but instead directed to where they could obtain 
this information. The change in strategy was based on the low percentage of members 
making an active choice (ibid). 
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The high level of participation in 2000 is attributed mainly to the fact that large 
numbers of the adult population were involved, and the assets invested consisted of 
accumulated pension entitlements for 1995-1999. There was also a major publicity 
campaign run by the scheme and mass media interest was high. In contrast, between 
2002 and 2007 most new pension savers were young people with small sums to invest 
(ibid). It is notable that during the period 2001-2005, the Swedish default fund 
performed better than an average of all funds that could be actively chosen, and was 
considerably cheaper (Tapia and Yermo, 2007).  
 
Survey data on the Australian superannuation scheme shows that four per cent of 
respondents had chosen a new fund as a conscious act of choice (rather than moving 
because of a change of job or similar) during the first three months of new legislation 
on the choice of fund (Clare, 2006).
10 A similar proportion (four or five per cent) said 
they were likely to change funds in the next 12 months (ibid).  
 
UK research cited in Byrne (2007) reports that about 80 per cent of members of group 
personal pension plans in the UK tended to prefer the default option. In the author’s 
own survey of occupational pension scheme members, however, around half (52 per 
cent) of respondents said they had accepted the plan default option (out of three 
possible options), while 48 per cent said they had made an active choice. The author 
goes on to report that almost 80 per cent of plan assets were in the default 'Balanced' 
fund, which means that many of those who had exercised active choice still decided 
this was the most appropriate fund for them. As this was the middle of three fund 
options, it may also be an illustration of ‘extremeness aversion’ among the plan 
members (ibid).
11  
 
In qualitative research conducted with people in the target group for automatic 
enrolment under the UK Government’s workplace pension reforms, most participants 
felt they would personally want to make an active investment choice if they were 
automatically enrolled into a scheme.
12 This was largely driven by a desire to have 
personal control over the level of investment risk, which generally meant ensuring 
that it was low risk. Participants considered that the provision of information was 
crucial to enabling active investment choice, and this included clear explanations of 
the different levels of risk associated with investment funds. There is evidence to 
suggest, however, that information provision in itself is not enough to drive action 
(Collard and Breuer, 2009). 
4.6  Summary of key points 
•  The extent of investment fund choice varies widely across the mandatory 
individual account pension schemes that operate worldwide. The greatest choice is 
seen in the US, Sweden and Australia. 
                                                 
10 Since 1 July 2005, the majority of Australian employees who receive superannuation contributions 
from their employers have been able to choose their superannuation fund. 
11 Byrne also notes that the survey respondent group had biases relative to the plan membership, which 
reinforced existing biases in the membership of the pension scheme relative to the general population, 
namely mainly male, older, higher earners. 
12 Though previous research indicates that people tend to be overly optimistic about taking action  
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•  US evidence indicates that increased investment fund choice reduces rather than 
increases the likelihood of participation in retirement savings plans, which 
supports the notion of choice and information overload. 
•  In qualitative research in the UK with the target group for automatic enrolment, 
participants considered that between three and five investment funds was a 
manageable number to choose from. 
•  Faced with complex decisions like investment choices, individuals use what are 
called naïve diversification strategies such as dividing their pension contribution 
equally among the number of funds offered by a scheme. Their choices are also 
influenced by the way in which investment fund choices are presented (known as 
framing effects).  
•  On the whole, individuals tend to focus more on minimising losses than 
maximising gains, even with long-term investments such as pensions. 
•  Overall, members of mandatory individual account pension schemes display a 
general preference for equities. This may partly be down to factors such as using 
mental shortcuts, how choices are framed and the advice that individuals receive. 
•  Evidence from US retirement savings plans shows that equity holding is polarised 
between those with all their pension savings invested in equities and those with 
nothing in equities. In addition, an increased number of investment fund choices is 
associated with a shift away from equities into lower-risk assets. 
•  UK qualitative research with the target group for automatic enrolment found that 
participants were mainly interested in the idea of investing in lower-risk rather 
than higher-risk pension funds. 
•  There is a positive link between income and asset allocation, but the differences in 
equity exposure by income are not great, suggesting that some lower-income 
individuals may be over-exposed to equities. 
•  There is evidence of very low levels of switching between investment funds by 
pension scheme members, suggesting that individuals tend to stick with their 
original choice. 
•  On the whole, international evidence supports the notion that a large number of 
investment options can cause information overload, resulting in confusion among 
scheme participants and greater use of default funds. As a result schemes that 
offer greater investment choice see lower levels of active decision making while 
those that offer a more limited choice generally see higher levels of active 
decision making. Factors such as advertising and information provision can have a 
considerable impact in terms of promoting active decision making. 
•  There is evidence to suggest that the availability of low-cost default funds that 
perform well can also result in lower levels of active investment choice. 
•  Qualitative research in the UK around proposed pension reforms found that most 
participants would personally want to make an active investment choice if they 
were automatically enrolled into a workplace pension scheme.
13 This was largely 
driven by a desire to have personal control over the level of investment risk. 
Adequate information was considered crucial if individuals were to make an 
investment choice, including clear explanations of the different levels of risk 
associated with investment funds. 
 
                                                 
13 Though previous research indicates that people tend to be overly optimistic about taking action  
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5  Pension savings adequacy 
Survey data from the US and the UK consistently show that many adults are either not 
confident that they have adequate savings for retirement or have no idea whether or 
not their savings will provide an adequate income in retirement. 
 
A survey at one large US corporation found that two-thirds of employees believed 
they were saving too little for retirement and this was confirmed by administrative 
data which indicated they had comparatively low savings rates (Choi et al., 2001b).  
 
Analysis of 1998 administrative data for employees at seven US firms indicated that 
among people aged 59.5 years and over, between 20 and 60 per cent made pension 
contributions below the threshold at which they became eligible for employer 
contributions, thereby foregoing a significant financial benefit. This was despite the 
fact that members could cash in any or all of the matched personal contribution 
immediately and without penalty (enabling them to retain wealth inside the plan and 
increase wealth outside the plan). Providing employees with information about the 
benefits they were losing out on did not raise contribution rates. There was evidence 
of lower levels of financial literacy among members contributing below the employer 
contribution threshold than those contributing at or above this threshold, as well as 
procrastination. The authors assert that the findings present cause for pessimism about 
the role of financial incentives in increasing retirement savings contributions (Choi et 
al., 2007).
14  
 
In a national consumer survey, 25 per cent of UK working adults were not at all 
confident and a further 33 per cent were not very confident that they would have 
sufficient income to live comfortably in retirement. A further 10 per cent did not 
know (Association of British Insurers, 2007). Similarly, in another UK survey about 
half of respondents yet to retire had no idea what their income in retirement would be; 
this figure was much lower among those approaching retirement (Clery et al., 2007). 
 
UK survey data provides estimates of the size and adequacy of people’s actual 
pension pots. In a UK national consumer survey, 62 per cent of respondents had a 
pension pot worth less than £40,000.
15  According to comparative tables produced by 
the FSA, a pension pot this size would generate a gross monthly income of £250 (£58 
per week).
16  Looked at another way, for a full-time employee on median earnings, a 
pension pot of £40,000 would generate a retirement income of 13 per cent of their 
pre-retirement income (this would be supplemented by state pension entitlement). 
Most respondents felt they needed 51 per cent or more of their current income to 
achieve a comfortable retirement but only 36 per cent believed they were on course to 
achieve this (Association of British Insurers, 2007).  
                                                 
14 There is an extensive body of research on the effectiveness of financial incentives and financial 
advice in encouraging pension saving, which was outside the remit of this review. 
15 This includes a personal or employed DC pension plan. 
16 The report notes that this is based on a single male non-smoker aged 65 who purchases a level 
annuity with no guarantee and excludes any tax-free lump sum taken out at the point of annuitisation.  
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The English Longitudinal Study of Ageing, which surveys individuals in households 
aged between 50 and State Pension Age, shows that the median value of those 
currently in a DC pension scheme was just £16,250. The mean value was around 
£35,500, indicating a skewed distribution with some very large values (Banks et al., 
2005). On average, those with a private pension (either currently or in the past) had 
greater pension wealth than those who never had a private pension.
17  Another survey 
of UK adults aged 18 to 69 similarly found that those with a private pension were 
more likely to have other resources that could help fund their retirement (namely a 
valuable house and significant liquid assets) than those without a private pension. 
They were also rather more likely to expect to inherit a substantial sum of money 
(Clery et al., 2007). In contrast, around three in ten respondents had no private 
pension and none of the other options to fund their retirement (ibid). 
5.1  Summary of key points 
•  Many adults are not confident that they are saving enough for their retirement and 
these concerns are borne out by analysis of actual pension savings adequacy. 
•  On the whole, individuals with a private pension are likely to have greater levels 
of pension wealth or other financial resources to fund their retirement than those 
who do not.  
 
                                                 
17 A private pension refers to any non-state pension, including personal pension, stakeholder or 
employer pensions.  
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6 Conclusions 
The review highlights that consumers generally lack any detailed knowledge or 
understanding of pensions and investments, even though they are increasingly 
expected to make their own financial provision for retirement. They also tend to be 
risk averse (women in particular), and seek to minimise losses rather than maximise 
gains, even in relation to long-term investments such as a pension. 
 
When faced with complex decisions such as pension fund investment choice, there is 
strong evidence that individuals do not behave according to economic theory. Instead 
they use a range of strategies and are influenced in a number of ways that may result 
in decisions that are less than optimal in terms of providing them with an adequate 
income in retirement. (These are explored in more detail below.) Indeed, many 
individuals are not confident that they are saving enough for their retirement and these 
concerns are borne out by analysis of actual pension savings adequacy. 
 
Evidence from the US suggests that information provision and financial education has 
a limited impact on individual behaviour in relation to making pension fund 
investment choices and switching funds. In Sweden, however, the communications 
strategy adopted by the mandatory pension scheme seems to have had a significant 
impact on levels of active decision making. While many people may rely on 
professional financial advice to make pension purchase and investment decisions, 
research evidence from the UK and Australia has highlighted concerns about the 
quality of advice provided to individuals (e.g. from financial advisers). 
 
The remainder of this section draws out the key messages from this review for the 
Personal Accounts Delivery Authority, with reference to the specific questions set out 
in the research specification.  
6.1  Do people make investment decisions that are too conservative to 
meet their intended objectives? 
The research evidence indicates a widespread lack of knowledge and understanding 
about pensions and investment choice. Coupled with this, UK consumers (and women 
in particular) are generally found to be risk averse (section 2). In keeping with this, 
consumers have been found to focus more on minimising financial losses than 
maximising financial gains, even when making decisions about long-term investments 
such as a pension (section 4.2). 
 
Faced with investment choices, there is evidence that people use ‘naïve diversification 
strategies’ (e.g. they may divide their pension contribution equally among the number 
of funds offered by a plan), which may result in sub-optimal decisions. Individuals’ 
investment decisions are also strongly influenced by the number and mix of 
investment choices that are offered (known as framing effects), highlighting the 
importance of pension plan design in achieving desired outcomes (section 4.2). 
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Giving people choice appears to encourage investment in equity funds and 
international evidence from mandatory individual account pension schemes reveals a 
general preference among participants for equity funds. This may result from factors 
such as framing effects, the use of ‘rules of thumb’ by consumers to make investment 
decisions or the professional advice that consumers receive. There is evidence from 
the US that allocation to equities is polarised between those participants who have no 
allocation to equities and those who have invested entirely in equities. Moreover, 
allocation to equities has been shown to decrease with the number of investment 
options offered (section 4.3).  
 
Recent qualitative research conduced with people in the target group for automatic 
enrolment under the UK Government’s workplace pension reforms indicated that 
participants were mainly interested in investing in lower-risk pension funds (section 
4.3). 
 
While there is evidence of a positive link between income and equity asset allocation 
in pension plans (with higher equity allocations among higher earners), studies in the 
US and Sweden indicate that the differences are not great. This suggests that some 
participants on lower incomes may have poorly diversified portfolios and be over-
exposed to risk. One explanation might be that these participants expect to have other 
resources in retirement, such as a state guaranteed minimum income, and so have 
little to lose by taking risks. Similar behaviour has been seen among people who have 
a defined benefit pension plan as well as a defined contribution plan (section 4.3.1). 
6.2  What is the likelihood of pension scheme members switching 
investment funds over time?  Is there any evidence that people 
switching between pension funds do not make sensible investment 
choices, given their personal and household circumstances? 
The evidence shows a general trend of low levels of investment fund switching by 
pension plan participants. Evidence from the US and Sweden indicates that fewer than 
two in ten pension plan members switched funds on at least one occasion in 2007. 
There is some evidence to suggest that providing information does little to encourage 
fund switching or rebalancing (section 4.4).  
 
There seems to be very little data about whether or not people make sensible choices 
when switching funds. One study in Australia highlighted problems with the advice 
provided to superannuation scheme members around fund switching, which involved 
advice to switch to higher fee funds with no countervailing benefits or the loss of 
important insurance cover (section 4.2.1). 
6.3  In the context of the personal accounts scheme, what is the 
evidence around individuals’ likelihood of making an active 
investment choice rather than staying in the default fund? 
There is considerable variation in levels of active decision making between countries 
that operate mandatory individual account pension schemes. On the whole, 
international evidence seems to support the notion that a large number of investment 
options can cause information overload, resulting in confusion among scheme 
participants and greater use of default funds. As a result, countries (such as Central 
and East European countries and Hong Kong) that offer limited investment choice  
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seem to have much higher levels of people making an active choice (over 80 per cent 
in some countries). In contrast, countries offering a wide choice of pension investment 
funds (US, Sweden, Australia) tend to have lower levels of people making active 
choices and correspondingly higher proportions of people enrolled in the default 
options (section 4.5). 
 
One study in the US found that between 65 and 87 per cent of new participants saved 
at least temporarily in the default fund and at the default contribution rate, and a 
significant proportion (45 per cent) continued to do so three years later. The generally 
conservative nature of default investment funds combined with low default 
contribution rates has raised concerns about the possible sub-optimal outcome for 
these plan members (section 4.5). 
 
In Sweden, overall figures show that 58 per cent of pension savers have made an 
active choice, but this masks a rapid decline in the proportion doing so over time, 
from 67 per cent when the scheme was introduced in 2000, to 1.6 per cent in 2007. It 
is notable that during the period 2001-2005, the Swedish default fund performed 
better than an average of all funds that could be actively chosen, and was considerably 
cheaper. The continued decline in active decision making between 2006 and 2007 is 
partly attributed to a change in the communications strategy, whereby scheme 
members no longer automatically receive information about their investment fund 
options (section 4.5).  
 
Evidence from Peru also suggests that default funds that have low charges and 
perform well can result in low levels of active investment choice (section 4.5). 
 
In qualitative research in the UK around proposed pension reforms, most participants 
said they would personally want to make an active investment choice if they were 
automatically enrolled into a workplace pension scheme.
18 This was largely driven by 
a desire to have personal control over the level of investment risk. Adequate 
information was considered crucial if individuals were to make an investment choice, 
including clear explanations of the different levels of risk associated with investment 
funds (section 4.5). 
                                                 
18 Though previous research indicates that people tend to be overly optimistic about taking action  
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